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The Securities and Exchange Commission was established by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' after the Securities Act of 1933 2
had been administered for a year by the Federal Trade Commission.
Since its establishment, it has been given a wide range of responsibil-
ities in the field of securities regulations.' This article will examine
the more important developments in this field during the 1960s.
I. GROWTH OF SEC RESPONSIBILITIES
In order to appreciate the nature of some of the problems that the
SEC encountered during the decade, it is necessary to examine the
changes in the securities markets over that period. Perhaps the most
impressive growth statistics over the past ten years have been those
* Former Chairman of the SEC, 1957-1961; Partner, Gadsby & Hannah, Boston,
Massachusetts & Washington, D.C.
1 15 U.S.C.	 78a-hh (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
3 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1964);
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbb (1964) ; the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § Sob et seq. (1964). The SEC also acts in an advisory capacity under the
corporate reorganization provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 572
et seq. (1964).
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relating to the stock exchanges. On December 31, 1959 the aggregate
value of all stock listed on exchanges was $338.4 billion.' On Decem-
ber 31, 1967 this figure had grown to $652 billion,' an increase of over
130 percent. During the year ending June 30, 1960, the transactions
on all exchanges involved 1.457 billion shares and a dollar volume
of $47.795 billion.' During the year ending December 31, 1968, the
number of shares traded had increased to 5.312 billion shares in-
volving $196.4 billion,' an increase in number of shares traded of al-
most 250 percent. This growth not only increased the volume of work
for the Commission, but also caused certain mechanical difficulties
in the operation of the stock markets which will be examined later
in this article.
In addition to the supervision of trading on exchanges, the SEC
must regulate the activities of brokers and dealers in the over-the-
counter market. On June 30, 1968 there were 4,397 broker-dealers
who were registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In
contrast to the marked increase in volume of trading, these are sub-
stantially fewer registrants than there were in 1960, when 5,288'
broker-dealers were registered. It is estimated that there are about
125,000 registered representatives connected with these broker-deal-
ers." Although no comparative figures are available, this is unques-
tionably a much larger number than would appear in 1960, if for no
other reason than the recent expansion of the life insurance companies
into the mutual fund and variable annuity fields. There are no avail-
able statistics as to the volume of transactions in the over-the-counter
market and it is impossible to trace the growth of such activities.
However, there is little doubt that such statistics, if available, would
show substantially the same growth as do the statistics for exchange
transactions.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND GUIDANCE PROCEDURE
A. Registration Statements
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC is required to
police registration statements of securities traded on the exchanges
and over-the-counter markets." One of the principal duties of the
Commission is to insure that the registration statements filed with
4 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 68 (1960).
5 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 183 (1968).
6 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 69 (1960).
7 Information supplied to the author by the SEC staff.
8 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 79 (1968).
26 SEC Ann. Rep. 89 (1960).
10
 Information supplied to the author by the SEC staff.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g)(1) (1964).
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it are truthful and complete.' 2
 Such statements, with certain excep-
tions,' must be filed by every corporation whose securities are to be
offered for sale to the public, and must contain such corporate infor-
mation as the statute and the SEC rules describe as material and
necessary to enable the proposed purchaser to make an informed
investment decision. The increase in market activity has had a direct
impact on the Commission's responsibility for registration statements.
The tremendous growth during the decade in the volume of filings
and securities trading greatly increased the pressure on the Commis-
sion and its staff, whose workload was already heavy in 1960. In the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, there were 1,628 such registration
statements filed with the SEC.' This compares with a total of 4,706
filings in the fiscal year 1969." Ncit only did the number of statements
which the SEC was called on to review show this very large increase,
but the dollar amounts involved increased even more notably. The
registration statements during the fiscal year 1960 involved only $15.8
billion while the comparable figure for fiscal 1969 was $86.9 billion."
The SEC is also concerned with the registration of investment com-
panies, including open-end investment companies, that is, mutual
funds. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, there were 570
such companies registered, having assets with an estimated market
value of $23.5 billion." At the end of the fiscal year 1968, there were
967 such companies and the market value of the assets had increased
to $69.7 billion.'
The increased volume of registration statements has resulted in
problems in processing these statements. The 1933 Act provides
that registration statements become effective on the twentieth day
after filing the statement or twenty days after the final amendment
to the statement."
By 1960 the practice of reviewing each registration statement and
furnishing a letter to the issuer detailing the amendments which would
be required before the registration statement could become effective
had become traditional in the operation of the SEC. This time limita-
tion has put the Commission's staff under a tremendous burden because
of the large number of registration statements filed. Consequently, the
Commission has decided that positive assurance of the facts reported
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)-(e) (1964) ; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h (1964).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1964).
14 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 35 (1960).
la Information supplied to the author by the SEC staff.
la 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 35 (1960). The 1969 figUre was supplied to the author by the
SEC staff.
17 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 168-69 (1960).
18 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 115 (1968).
19 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964).
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would involve so great an undertaking in time and money as to impede
business financing by a public sale of securities." Thus, the Commis-
sion has streamlined its registration procedures in a number of respects
and generally will notify the registrant only when the statement is
unnecessarily long, complex or verbose or otherwise presents serious
problems."
Some observers feel that the Commission's modification of its
routines to provide more streamlined procedures to cope with the in-
creased volume of work has been at the expense of its traditional
effectiveness. A management survey conducted by independent consul-
tants in 1960 recommended to Congress that the Commission needed,
at that time, additional manpower to prevent deterioration of its reg-
ulatory standards." In the decade since this report was issued and in
the face of the rapid expansion of the securities industry, Congress
has not aided the Commission by increasing budget allocations. In
fiscal 1960 the Commission's budget called for a total of $8,100,000
encompassing 954 positions." For the fiscal year 1969 the budget
was $17,830,000 encompassing 1,303 positions24—a staff smaller than
the 1,468 positions provided in the 1964 budget."
B. Development of Regulation of Exchanges
Prior to the 1960s, there was relatively little tendency on the
part of the SEC to interfere with the machinery of the stock exchanges
even though the Commission has considerable power to do so under
the 1934 Act." However, in 1960 an investigation by the SEC into
the activities of some of the members of the American Stock Exchange
disclosed that the self-regulation of at least that exchange left a great
deal to be desired. 27
 The situation in the American Exchange was rec-
tified by a negotiated reorganization, whereby a new constitution was
adopted significantly modifying the administrative procedures of the
Exchange. This reorganization tightened the requirements for listing
20 SEC, Work of the SEC 4 (1969).
21 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4934 (Nov. 21, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 77,627. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. fi 77,636; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4475 (April 3, 1962), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. X11 3925-27, 4507.04.
22 See 27 SEC Ann. Rep. 6 (1961).
23 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 226 (1960).
24
 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 173 (1968).
25 30 SEC Ann. Rep. 161 (1964).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964).
27 SEC, Staff Report on Organization, Management and Regulation of Conduct of
Members of the American Stock Exchange 53 (1962) concludes:
There can be little doubt that in the case of the American Stock Exchange the
statutory scheme of self-regulation in the public interest has not worked out
in the manner originally envisioned by Congress.
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companies on the Exchange, placed greater restrictions on the spe-
cialists,' and required that listed companies solicit proxies for all
shareholders' meetings and publish quarterly earning reports." •
Negotiations between the exchanges and the SEC are continuing
and a number of important changes in the procedures of the exchanges
have been effected. One such change involved the abolishment of
customer-directed give-ups," and the institution of a minimum com-
mission scale, under which the seller of a very large block of stock is
charged a smaller commission per share than is charged for smaller
transactions.31
Another problem which arose more recently involved the previ
ously noted increase in the volume of trading during the decade. This
increase caused very serious delays in brokers' deliveries of securities
traded (known technically as "fails") and in brokers' bookkeeping
entries. These delays often result in substantial inconvenience or dam-
age to the public customers. Various steps were taken by the ex-
changes and by the SEC to reduce such delays. Thus, the exchanges
have shortened the time during which they are open,' and the SEC
has labelled as fraudulent the activities of a dealer who is aware that
he cannot make delivery or payment within a reasonable time because
of delays caused by administrative difficulties." The Commission has
imposed sanctions in some cases, and has exerted constant pressure
on the broker-dealers in formal and informal statements." While it
cannot be said that the problem has been solved, both the SEC and
28 Specialists are floor traders who generally deal in one security. Their function
is to assure an orderly market in that security by matching purchasers and sellers.
28 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7774 (Dec. 30, 1965), CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 77,316. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7566 (April 8, 1965),
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I[ 77,226, which extended proxy rules to the over-the-counter
market.
28 On Dec. 5, 1968, the national exchanges adopted rules abolishing customer-directed
give-ups. This give-up procedure involved permitting a customer to direct payment
of part of a broker's commission to another broker. See letter from Robert W. Haack
(President of the New York Stock Exchange) to Manuel F. Cohen (Chairman of the
SEC), Nov. 19, 1968, reprinted in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
fi 77,631. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 77,523.
81 Letter from Robert W. Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, Aug. 8, 1968, reprinted in
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,585.
82 The SEC is given power to regulate the trading hours of the exchanges by 15
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(4) (1964). Prior to 1968 the hours for trading on the New York
Exchange were from 10:00 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. Alter numerous measures were employed
in 1968 to reduce these hours, in 1969 the Exchange reduced trading hours by an hour
and a half by setting the trading hours from 10:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8363 (July 29, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 77,583.
84 SEC. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8484 (Dec. 26, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. f[ 77,648.
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the exchanges, prodded by the SEC, have substantially reduced delays
and are studying possible improvements in the exchange machinery
to conform with the structure of modern business. It is impossible to
foretell the direction which such improvements will take, since the
problems are immensely intricate. The securities markets and the
bookkeeping methods of the broker-dealers were designed to cope
with the demands of business as it was conducted prior to 1960. There
has, of course, been some utilization of computer techniques, but
transferring and delivering the paper representing the tremendous
volume of trades in today's market is extremely complex. The SEC
is very much aware of these problems and is interested in protecting
the position of the public investors. Thus, it is in constant contact
with the exchange representatives working in this area. This is indic-
ative of the increased concern of the SEC in the activities of the
exchanges in the past ten years, and of the increased control exercised
by the Commission over the exchanges.
C. Member Firms
Broker-dealers have, from time to time, become insolvent to the
detriment of their customers. The SEC and the exchanges have strin-
gent rules regarding a broker-dealer's capital position,' which they
apply in unscheduled audits. Nevertheless, failures do occur, and prior
to 1960 the customers had to rely upon the actions of the bankruptcy
court.
A member firm of the New York Stock Exchange, Ira Haupt,
developed serious financial problems in 1963, and its customers were
faced with heavy losses. The Exchange came to the rescue and made
payments totalling $12 million to Haupt's customers." Shortly there-
after the Exchange established a trust fund, and the policy is now
firmly established that a New York Stock Exchange customer is pro-
tected from financial loss by reason of a member firm's insolvency.
The New York Exchange has recently indicated that the trust fund
will be increased from the present level of $25.9 million to $100 mil-
lion."
III. STATUTORY AND RULE CHANGES
A. The Special Study
The rapid growth and changing nature of the securities market
during the years after the Commission's formation made many stat-
35 Basically these rules require that the indebtedness of the broker-dealer not
exceed 20 times his net assets (assets minus liabilities), see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1969).
36 Information supplied to the author by the New York Stock Exchange.
37 Wall Street Journal, May 1, 1970, at 4, col. 3.
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utory and rule changes necessary. It became clear, however, that
before any major changes could be instituted by the Commission, a
detailed analysis of the securities markets and the Commission itself
had to be undertaken. Probably the most important development in
the field of securities regulation during the past decade was the Spe-
cial Study of the Securities Markets which was authorized by Congress
early in September, 1961.' 8
 A number of factors contributed to the
institution of this study, but behind them all was the realization, which
the SEC managed to convey to Congress, that it had too little infor-
mation and data in its files regarding the securities industry. Without
such data, no meaningful analysis preliminary to amendment of the
six statutes administered by the SEC was possible. The Commission
therefore decided to undertake a special study of the securities in-
dustry. As soon as the enabling act was effective, the Commission
retained Milton H. Cohen as director, who was assisted by a staff
averaging about 65 persons—some retained specially and some bor-
rowed from the regular personnel of the Commission. This study
resulted in a monumental report' )
 which ran to over 3,000 pages of
text, charts, tables, and data, the first chapters of which were sent
to Congress on April 3, 1963.
The report of the Special Study made numerous recommendations
in connection with many of the activities of the securities business
and the SEC. It suggested some legislation and made recommenda-
tions regarding many of the SEC rules and numerous other reforms
of one type or another. The Study placed special emphasis on the
activities of broker-dealers, and recommended that a system of licens-
ing and registering brokers and other personnel be implemented to
assure a continuous record of background information and other qual-
ifications." The Study also recommended that broker-dealers be reg-
ulated and supervised by internal regulations of exchange members4 '
and by requiring them to join self-regulatory groups as a prerequisite
of registration.42 A final recommendation of the Special Study relating
to broker-dealers was that the New York Stock Exchange establish
standards governing the representations of the quality of a member's
research and advisory departments to prevent irresponsible and decep-
tive representations.43
Other of the many important recommendations of the Special
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1964).
39 SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study].
40 Special Study pt. 5, at 46-47.
41 Id. at 45-46.
42 Id
. at 54.
43 Id. at 59-60.
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Study include: (1) a proposal to establish rules to prevent artificially
high premiums on primary issues," (2) a proposed rule to assure that
specialists maintain an orderly market,' (3) the abolishment of floor
traders," (4) a proposal to increase the Federal Reserve Board's con-
trol over margin requirements,' and (5) a proposal to improve the
New York Stock Exchange by extending voting rights to "allied"
members rather than limiting them to "seat" members." Undoubtedly,
the Special Study is the most comprehensive examination ever under-
taken of the securities market and has influenced the activities of the
Commission during the decade.
B. The 1964 Amendments
The Special Study recommended amendments to expand the
coverage of the Securities Acts in the over-the-counter security. mar-
ket." The first step in the implementation of the Study's recommenda-
tions came in 1964 when Congress enacted a bill containing numerous
amendments to the 1934 Act." These amendments had two important
goals. Before these amendments, the requirements under the 1934
Act for registration statements," periodical reports,' proxy state-
ments," and reports of beneficial stock ownership by directors, offi-
cers and 10-percent shareholders" were not fully applicable to secu-
rities traded in the over-the-counter market. The first important aspect
of the amendments was to make these provisions applicable to issuers
with total assets over one million dollars and more than 500 share-
holders whose securities are traded in the over-the-counter market."
44 Id. at 87.
45 Id. at 88.
48 Id. at 97.
47
 Id. at 159-60.
48 Id. at 183.
42
 Id. at 151-56.
50 Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
51
 15 U.S.C. § 78! (1964).
52 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
53
 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
55 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78! (1964); 15 U.S.C. § 78n,
formerly ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964), formerly ch. 404,
§ 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934). The purpose of the amendments relating to over-the-counter
markets was to:
(1) Extend to issuers of securities traded in over-the-counter markets, where
the issuers have over $1 million in total assets and 750 stockholders of record
(reduced to 500 after 2 years), the same requirements that now apply to issuers
of securities which are listed on an exchange, namely:
(a) Registration requiring disclosure of certain information about the
issuer including financial statements (sec. 12);
(b) Periodic reporting (sec. 13) ;
(c) Information, including financial statements, to accompany proxy
solicitation; or if no solicitation, equivalent information to be supplied (sec. 14);
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The second aim of the amendments was to strengthen the power
of the Commission to impose qualification standards and disciplinary
control upon over-the-counter brokers or dealers. This was accom-
plished by numerous amendments to Sections 15 and 15A of the 1934
Act." The amendments gave the Commission power to register a
broker, dealer or any person "associated with" such broker or dealer, 57
and to assure that brokers or dealers and all persons associated with
them meet appropriate standards of training and experience." The
Commission was also empowered to censure, suspend, or revoke the
registration of a broker or dealer," and to censure, bar or suspend
any person associated with a broker or dealer. 6° Finally, the amend-
ments relating to brokers or dealers expanded the Commission's power
over securities dealers associations by requiring qualification stan-
dards for membership, 01 and by providing Commission review of dis-
ciplinary actions by these associations against their members.' In
short, the amendments greatly expanded the Commission's controls
over brokers or dealers and their associates."
(d) Reporting of changes in stockholdings in an issuer by officers, directors,
or 10-percent stockholders of the issuer, and making any short-term profits
resulting from transactions in the stock subject for a period of 2 years to
recapture by the issuer (sec. 16).
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3 (1964), amending ch. 404, § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) &
ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(a) (1)-(b) (1) (1964).
58 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (8) (1964).
59 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1964).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1964).
61 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) ( 5 ) (1964).
62 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1964).
eg The House Report on the amendments describes them as an attempt to:
Strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter broker-dealers, including qualifi-
cations, standards and disciplinary controls by:
(a) Requiring such association [the National Association of Security
Dealers] to establish standards of training, experience, and competence for
members and employees, and capital requirement for members;
(b) Permitting the Commission, and the securities association in a disci-
plinary action to proceed directly against an employee of a broker-dealer, in
lieu of against the firm, and permitting the Commission to employ sanctions,
such as suspension, short of revoking registration;
(c) Requiring that registered securities associations must have rules designed
to produce fair and informative retail quotations for unlisted securities;
(d) Broadening of the Commission's power to alter or supplement associ-
ation rules relating to organization, discipline, and eligibility for membership
eliminating in the case of registered broker-dealers the necessity for proving
that the mails and instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce were used
in a particular prohibited transaction; authorizing a registered association to
adopt rules under which it might exclude from membership persons who had
been suspended or expelled from a national securities exchange; shortening
the period for appeals to the Commission from action taken by a registered
securities association from 60 to 30 days;
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The enactment of these amendments had a profound effect on
the SEC and the securities industry—an effect which is still being
felt in Washington and on Wall Street. One obvious result was to
remove the incentive of many issuers to refrain from listing their
securities on an exchange, since under these amendments the unlisted
issuers are subject to almost the same disclosure requirements as the
listed issuers. Another important result has been to pinpoint respon-
sibility for broker-dealer shortcomings, and to strengthen the self-reg-
ulatory position of the National Association of Securities Dealers.
The most significant result, however, has been a rather indirect but
nonetheless effective increase in the regulatory power of the SEC over
the entire securities industry.
C. The Wheat Report
For many years there has been great dissatisfaction among indi-
viduals dealing with the Securities Acts concerning the relationship
of the private offering exemption" to the concept of control under the
1933 Act,65 and concerning the lack of unity between the requirements
for disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 and those under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The underlying theory of both
Acts as originally enacted was to compel "full disclosure" of corporate
affairs, and both Acts have specific provisions for this purpose, al-
though there was little or no coordination between them.
While the dissatisfaction with the Acts' discrepancies was ade-
quately expressed when the reporting requirement of the 1934 Act
applied only to listed securities, it became even more intense when
the 1964 Amendments brought many more corporations under SEC
control. Therefore, responding to the suggestions of the Bar, the SEC,
under the leadership of Commissioner Francis Wheat, attempted to
find methods of administratively settling these problems. This com-
mittee filed its report with the Commission in 1968, making some
scholarly, logical recommendations for rule changes which would do
away with much of the uncertainty and complexity which have plagued
practitioners under the Securities Acts from the time of their adoption,
(e) Granting the Commission power to regulate brokers and dealers who
choose not to become members of registered securities associations in order
to insure that all brokers and dealers will be subject to the expanded regulation
provided by this act either through a registered association which they volun-
tarily join or alternatively by the Commission itself.
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1964).
64 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964) exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering" from the registration requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1964).
65 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1964) places a person having a controlling stock interest
in the position of an issuer thus making the controlling shareholder subject to the
requirements of registration in 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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and which would encourage the widespread dissemination of the in-
formation required to be filed under the 1934 Act.
"The Study determined to explore what could be done within
the '33 and '34 Acts as they presently exist,"" because the Commis-
sion was certain that complete statutory reform would take many
years. The Wheat Report contained 61 specific recommendations as
to rule changes and procedure modifications. Some of the more im-
portant recommendations are those regarding prospectuses, the small
offering exemption, the underwriter and control provisions of Section
2(11) of the 1933 Act(' as they affect the registration exemption of
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act," and registration requirements.
The Report recommends that the content of prospectuses required
by the 1933 Act" be expanded to include the sales and earnings of
"separate lines of business," a statement of the sources and uses of
funds, and a statement indicating management's background and ex-
perience." In addition, the Report recommends that unreasonably long,
complex or verbose prospectuses not be commented upon or approved
by the Commission as is presently the case with registration state-
ments,' and that long prospectuses contain summarized information
regarding the issuer. 72
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933," the Commis-
sion is given discretion to exempt securities from the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act74 if the amount of the offering is less than
$300,000. The Wheat Report recommends that this provision be made
less restrictive by adopting various changes in Regulation A govern-
ing the small offering exemption." The effect of these amendments
would be to allow a person who is not the issuer or an "affiliate" to
resell less than $100,000 of the securities if held less than one year."
A very important recommendation attempts to clarify the test
employed in determining who is an underwriter under Section 2(11)
of the 1933 Act." The restriction placed on the marketability of stock
66 SEC, Disclosure to Investors—A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under
the '33 and '34 Acts (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat Report].
67 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1964).
68 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964).
60
 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
70 Wheat Report 89-94.
71 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4934 (Nov. 21, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. if 77,627.
72 Wheat Report 80-81.
73 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964).
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h (1964).
75 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1969).
76 Wheat Report 301-04.
7 7 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (1964).
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by the definitions of that section adopted by the SEC" and the courts"
caused a great deal of uncertainty and confusion in dealing with con-
trol stock and stock which was originally sold in a nonpublic offering
under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act." This problem arose primarily
because the definition of underwriter in section 2(11) includes a person
purchasing "with an intent to participate in a distribution," thus
establishing a subjective test of intent which is difficult to administer.
The Wheat Report recommended a number of rule changes to clarify
such problems arising in secondary distributions." For example, the
Report's proposed rule 163 82 would establish an objective test of in-
tent by specifying those situations in which a person would be con-
sidered an underwriter."
A final recommendation of the Report was a proposal to inter-
relate the disclosure provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Thus the
Report recommends that if there has not been full disclosure of a
company's business earnings and financial conditions under Sections
13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act," then a sale to the public should be
subject to the same disclosure provisions required for registration
statements under the 1933 Act." Conversely, if a security is registered
under Section 13 of the 1934 Act, then secondary sales to the public
with certain exceptions should be allowed without imposing the reg-
istration requirements of the 1933 Act." To implement such a rule,
the Report also noted that safeguards must be adopted to prevent
the sale to the public of unregistered securities by utilizing a private
purchaser. Thus in a private placement, the private purchaser would
be required to hold unregistered securities for one year" unless the
transaction is exempted under Section 3 of the 1933 Act."
Although these recommendations are greatly oversimplified here,
the effect of the proposals relating to registration is to establish an
objective test upon which an issuer, private purchaser or controlling
stockholder can rely to determine whether a distribution or sale vio-
78 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 1111 2165.15, 2850.25, 2850.81.
79 See, e.g., Gilligan Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959).
80 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964).
81 Wheat Report 152-247.
82 Id. at 203-05.
83 'The test of Rule 163 is an objective one. Its components . . . have been
defined by other rules. It will not be necessary to prove that a person lacked investment
intent in order to find that he is an underwriter of securities . . .
Id. at 204.
84 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1964).
85 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964).
86 Wheat Report 19-20.
87 Id. at 21-23.
88 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964).
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Tates Section 5 of the 1933 Act." The Wheat Report has been ac-
cepted by the Commission, and if its recommendations are adopted,
the decade of the 1970s could see a profound change in the adminis-
tration of the Securities Acts.
D. Proposed Mutual Fund Legislation
Shortly before the 1960s, a study of the mutual fund industry
was commenced by the Wharton School of Finance. This study was
filed with the Commission in 1962. 9° Certain aspects of this industry
were also reviewed by the Special Study." After these two reports
had been completed, the Commission submitted an extensive report
on mutual funds to Congress." This report analyzed the Investment
Company Act of 194093
 and concluded that it had prevented the most
serious abuses by mutual funds9 4 However, the report indicated that
amendments were needed to assure the reasonableness of management
fees and sales charges." In May, 1967, the Commission submitted a
bill to Congress recommending amendments to the Investment Com-
pany Act."
In general, the proposed bill seeks to insure that management fees,
including salaries of the directors of the fund, will be reasonable by
leaving the determination of reasonableness to the courts. In addition,
the proposed bill would have a profound effect on sales charges, par-
ticularly the fund's use of a front-end load, whereby the bulk of the
sales charges are collected during the first year of an installment pay-
ment program. The proposed bill would provide for a maximum sales
charge of 5 percent of the market value of the fund shares purchased,
but the Commission would have the power to set higher charges. The
bill also would abolish the front-end load by requiring that all sales
charges be spread equally over all installments. 97 The mutual fund
industry has rather violently and so far successfully opposed some
of the proposed amendments," and at this writing the future of the
proposals is uncertain. Clearly, however, some regulation is needed
to correct the existing abuses.
89 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
00 H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
91 Special Study 63.
92 SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth
(1966), reprinted as H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Investment Co. Report].
98 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964).
94 Investment Co. Report 13.
95 Id. at 21.
90 The text of the bill appears in Hearings on S. 1959, Sen. Comm. on Banking
& Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, app. 1,897 (1967).
97 Id. pt. 1, at 21-41.
98 Id. at 186, 372.
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E. Regulation of Floor Traders and Specialists
Two of the areas which were the particular targets for investiga-
tion by the Special Study were the activities of floor traders and spe-
cialists on the exchanges. The Special Study report included specific
proposals to abolish almost all floor traders and more closely regulate
specialists." As a result of extended discussions between the SEC and
the exchanges, the SEC promulgated rules under Section 11 of the
1934 Act.t"O requiring the exchanges to adopt rules radically changing
their approach to these two problems. The rule governing floor trad-
ing prohibits such trading with exceptions for specialists, odd-lot
dealers and arbitrage transactions."' The rule governing specialists
requires national securities exchanges to establish registration require-
ments and rules regulating specialists' transactions.'" The rule also
empowers the Commission to suspend specialists for violations of ex-
change rules or failure to maintain an orderly market.'"
In practice, the exchange rules which the SEC insisted upon all
but abolished floor trading and have materially improved the exchange
standards governing the activities of specialists. In fact, there were
only about 30 floor traders on the New York Stock Exchange after
the adoption of these rules as compared with 300 or more in prior
years.
F. Regulation of Tender Offers
At the opening of the 1960s the general procedure for a person
who wanted control of a corporation because he was dissatisfied with
the management or for some other reason was to start a proxy contest
in an attempt to oust the incumbent directors by convincing the share-
holders to vote for a new slate of directors. This was always a highly
speculative course of action because the stockholders almost always
prefer the known management to the unknown, and because a proxy
fight is far more expensive for the interloper than for the entrenched
management since the latter can use the corporate treasury to finance
a proxy battle. It should also be noted that the interloper adopting
this course of action had nothing to show for his time and money if
his slate of directors was defeated. Comparative statistics show the
difficulty which non-management persons have had in proxy contests.
In the year ending June 30, 1960, there were 25 proxy contests.'
Non-management persons were unsuccessful in all 12 completed con-
99 Special Study 87-91, 97-98.
luo 15
	
§ 78k (1964).
10l 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (1969).
102 17 C.F.R.	 240.11b-1(a) (1969).
103 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(b) (1969).
104 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 88 (1960).
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tests involving control of the board of directors, and in the 9 cases
where non-management personnel sought representation on the board
of directors, management retained all directorships in 7 elections."'
The results were no better later in the decade. During the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1968, non-management persons won control in only
one of twelve completed elections."'
As the futility of a proxy fight became more evident, the cor-
porate raiders turned from proxy fights to tender offers of cash,
securities or of some combination of the two. Naturally, if the raider
could raise the money, he would prefer the cash offer since a registra-
tion statement covering any securities he offered in exchange for the
target company's stock would not be required. Even if the effort to
obtain control in this manner is unsuccessful, the offeror, unlike the
proxy contestant, is left with a substantial block of stock, upon which,
if his estimates of the corporation's potential are accurate, he can
realize a handsome profit.
The almost universal failure of persons making cash tender offers
to make public any material information as to their reasons for mak-
ing the offer or any of the other details of the offer raised grave ques-
tions in the minds of the SEC and Congress as the practice became
more prevalent. Thus, in 1968 Congress amended Sections 13 and
14 of the 1934 Act i07 and the SEC adopted rules thereunder' s to
control tender offers. These provisions now require persons who have
acquired on the open market 10 percent or more of the stock of a
company registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act,'" or those
making tender offers to the shareholders, to file information with the
SEC disclosing the plans and intentions of the persons filing, the per-
sonalities involved, and the details of the tender offer. Certain other
limitations were placed on tender offers, such as requiring a with-
drawal privilege for the offeree," 0 a pro rata acceptance by the of-
feror,' and an equal price treatment to all offerees. 1 2
Since the enactment of this legislation and the adoption of the
rules thereunder, there have been a number of such takeover bids,
some of which have been bitterly contested in the courts."' In one
105 Id. at 88-89.
103 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 42 (1968).
107 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, 78n (1964).
los 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, .14d-1 (1969).
"9 15	 § 781 (1964).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
111 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. IV, 1969).
112 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(9) (Supp. IV, 1969).
113 See, e.g., Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969).
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recent case, Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.,'" Sus-
quehanna alleged that Pan American Sulphur (PASCO) failed to
disclose, as required by section 13(d), that it sought control of Sus-
quehanna's board of directors.15
 The court rejected this contention
since PASCO had stated in the tender offer that it desired working
control of Susquehanna to operate it as a subsidiary. The court in-
, dicated that a reasonable stockholder or investor would realize that
Susquehanna "intended to exercise strong control over [PASCO].”"'
The court held, moreover, that although sections 13(d) and 14(d)
require the offeror
fairly to disclose its plans in the event of a takeover, it is not
required to make predictions of future behavior which may
cause the offeree or the public investors to rely on them un-
justifiably.'"
Although the law is too new to establish concrete standards, it
it clear that the courts may require only full and fair disclosure of
possible or probable actions to be taken if the tender offer is success-
ful, rather than exact specificity.
G. Developments in Accounting Rules
One of the most important effects of the Securities Acts was to
introduce responsible accounting practices into corporate financial
statements and reports. The SEC was given plenary power over such
accounting methods in both the 1933 Act" 8 and the 1934 Act,"° and
it has specified in some detail the form of the reports required to be
filed.'" In general, the Commission requires that such reports follow
currently recognized accounting practices which truly reflect corpo-
rate financial conditions. In the past decade, this concern has been
growing because of the increasing emphasis on full disclosure of all
corporate affairs.
1. Product Line Accounting
Until 1960 most corporations kept records enabling them to de-
termine whether their manufacturing operations in producing a given
product were profitable, and were very careful not to expose such
figures to the public. The general attitude of the reporting companies
114 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,610 (5th Cir. March 13, 1970).
115 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1964).
115 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 92,610, at 98,754.
117 Id. at 98,757.
118 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1964).
115 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1964).
120 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1969).
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was that such breakdowns were valuable only for internal purposes,
and that their publication would be interesting only to their competi-
tors.
This attitude became increasingly widespread and met with in-
creasing criticism by the SEC and by accountants as the tendency of
large corporations to acquire unrelated businesses became more pro-
nounced during the 1960s. Corporate diversification became the goal
of a large number of entities controlling major aggregations of capital,
not only among manufacturing and service corporations, but also
among railroads and banks. In order to enable the public to analyze
the effects of this diversification upon securities, the SEC, with the
concurrence of the preponderance of the accountants, has adopted
accounting rules requiring detailed information of the activities of
subsidiaries and a separate profit and loss statement for subsidiaries
contributing 10 percent or more to sales or earnings of diversified cor-
porations.121
2. Equity Equivalents
Until shortly after 1960, the accounting problems raised by con-
vertible securities' 22
 were of relatively little importance to the finan-
cial community. There had been some use of the conversion feature,
but general accounting practice did not require special treatment in
financial reports indicating that the outstanding preferred stock or
debentures could be converted into another security, and that their
market price was largely dependent upon the price of the securities
into which they could be converted.
In connection with the rash of corporate acquisitions which be-
gan in the 1960s, the acquiring companies in some instances utilized
convertible securities in order either to offer them in exchange for
the securities of the acquired company or to raise cash for the pur-
pose of making such acquisition. The tax advantages to the issuer
combined with an increasing awareness on the part of the investors
of the advantages of convertible securities caused more corporations
to use this method of raising capital. Since the financial community
and investors attach great importance to the per share earnings on
common stock and, in fact, continually study the per share price-earn-
ings ratio' in arriving at the fair value of a given security, the SEC
finally came to the conclusion that if the market price of the conver-
121 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (June 14, 1969), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
Tr 77,729.
122 Convertible securities are preferred stock or debentures with fixed rates of return
which are convertible into common stock during a specified time period for a specified
price.
123 The price-earning's ratio is the ratio of the price per share of the stock to the
per share earnings of the corporation.
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tible security was heavily influenced by the conversion feature, the per
share earnings should be computed on the assumption that the con-
vertible security was completely converted into the underlying secu-
rity. 124
3. Merger Accounting
The rise of the corporate conglomerate has given birth to another
problem—currently the subject of some rather acrimonious discussion
among corporate managers and accountants—involving the proper
treatment of the respective balance sheets of the merging corporations
and of the resultant corporation. For many years, two radically differ-
ent concepts of accounting for business combinations effected through
exchange of stock have been considered acceptable by the accounting
profession. Under "purchase accounting," the fair value of the prop-
erty or other consideration exchanged for the stock is accounted for
in the proper asset item of the statements of the resulting enterprise.
The difference between the total value of the consideration given and
the value of the property acquired and so entered is then segregated
and generally referred to as goodwill.
In "pooling of interests" accounting, the amounts at which assets
and liabilities are recorded in the accounts of the predecessor com-
panies are simply carried forward to the accounts of the continuing
enterprise. As originally Conceived, this technique had a rather limited
application, but in the flurry of business combinations during the de-
cade, the SEC and the accounting profession found that this method
of accounting was in almost general use. The pooling of interests ap-
proach lends itself to a number of questionable uses since the fair
value of the property at the date of acquisition is not reflected on the
books. In 1963 and 1968, the American Institute of Certified Account-
ants published studies in which the pooling of interest concept was
seriously criticized and the difficulties inherent in the purchase ap-
proach to the determination and amortization of accounting goodwill
were analyzed.
The difficult problems in this controversy have not yet been set-
tled. The entrepreneurs are vitally interested in preserving their earn-
ings which, of course, would be decreased by amortization charges.
On the other hand, the independent accountants and the SEC are
equally anxious that the financial statements be accurate and not mis-
leading. The eventual outcome of this controversy is at this point
uncertain, but Commission action will undoubtedly be forthcoming.
124 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4910 (June 18, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
7'7,567.
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H. Variable Annuity Rules
Prior to the 1960s, the SEC prevailed in the Supreme Court in
its contention that variable annuities' issued by life insurance com-
panies were securities subject to the Acts it was administering. 12 °
Having won this point, the Commission devoted the next few years
to trying to fit such securities into its regulatory framework. After
struggling with the problem and facing innumerable applications for
exemptions from the Investment Company Act.'" as the insurance
business edged into the mutual funds area, the Commission recently
adopted new rules standardizing such applications for exemptions.' 28
I. Other Rule Changes
The SEC has always been quite flexible in exercising its rule-
making powers under the various acts. Thus, during the past decade
it has been prompt to propose amendments to its rules whenever prob-
lems arose which could not be readily solved in any other way. It
has also been increasingly sensitive to the criticism that it does not
publish its administrative policies. In 1967 and 1968, for instance, it
amended its proxy rules in numerous respects not only to make some
desirable substantive changes, but also to include numerous accrued
administrative interpretations.' Similarly, in 1968 it published new
guidelines for drafting its registration Forms S1 (for general use by
manufacturing, mercantile and service corporations) and S5 (for use
by investment companies).'"
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW.
Ever since their adoption the Securities Acts have been a fruitful
source of litigation. This is most certainly true of the ten years just
ended. Not only has the SEC been constantly in court as plain-
tiff or defendant, but civil actions where the SEC is not a party are
commonly brought under the Acts. For example, by June 30, 1960 the
125 A variable annuity is an annuity whose payout is fixed by the value of the equity
securities in which the premiums are invested as they are paid. This differs from the
traditional annuity whereby the insurer agrees to pay the annuitant a stated periodic
sum after he reaches a given age.
126 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See also SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
127 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964).
128 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5738 (July 10, 1969), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,727. These rules specify the sections of the Investment Co. Act
from which an issuer of variable annuities may be granted complete or partial exemption.
129 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8206 (Dec. 14, 1967), CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. J 77,507.
130 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1[ 77,636.
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SEC bad brought through the years 986' 31 injunctive proceedings in
the district courts, principally under Section 20 of the 1933 Act' and
Section 27 of the 1934 Act. 133 This figure had grown to 1,648 by June
30, 1968' 34 or an average of 83 cases a year from 1960 to 1968. It
would extend this survey to unwarranted length to adequately describe
all of the Securities Acts litigation reported over the past decade, and
it must suffice to examine only the more important decisions to trace
the most important developments.
A. 1933 Act Cases
Although many cases were brought in the 1960s under the 1933
Act,'" only two were of particular significance. The outstanding de-
velopment during the decade under the Securities Act of 1933 was
unquestionably the decision in Escott• v. BarChris Const. Corp.'3 6
Although the opinion in this case came as no particular surprise
to sophisticated practitioners, and really did not establish any new
or extraordinary principle, it did involve some well-known persons
and was very effective in reminding the securities industry of the
necessity for adequate care in the drafting of a prospectus. The case
centered around an issue of debentures marketed by a bowling alley
construction corporation and the defendants included some of the
company's officers and directors, its lawyers, the underwriters and
the company's auditor. After a careful analysis of the prospectus and
the testimony, Judge McLean held that the prospectus contained
materially false statements and omissions, and that all the defendants
failed to sustain their burden of proving due diligence.'" He also
found that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs was not caused
solely by factors other than the materially false statements and omis-
sions,'" and consequently found the defendants liable for damages.
The BarChris case resulted in a number of emphatic warnings
through various media to lawyers and to the securities industry that
anyone who signs a registration statement should assure himself that
the statements made therein are accurate by independently checking
its contents. Thus its primary importance was making corporate of-
ficers aware of their duty to assure full and fair disclosure.
181 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 288 (1960).
132 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1964).
183 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
184 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 189 (1968).
188 Professor Loss enumerates approximately sixty 1933 Act cases in 6. L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 3820-24 (Supp. 1969).
180 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
187 Id. at 683-703.
188 Id. at 703-04.
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rn Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,'" a case which aroused
somewhat less pother, but which perhaps deserves more attention
than it has thus far received, the court settled two problems which
had for many years intrigued practitioners and commentators. This
case involved a security issue allegedly exempt under Section 3(a) of
the 1933 Act.14° The jury in the lower court found that the offering
circular was materially false, and that the underwriter knew this fact
when it sold the issue. Consequently, the plaintiff was awarded com-
pensatory and punitive damages."' The court of appeals found that the
power to impose punitive damages was not necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the 1933 Act."' The court also noted that Section 28(a)
of the 1934 Ace" confined the plaintiff to compensatory damages, and
held that since the 1933 Act should be construed to be compatible with
the 1934 Act, punitive damages should not be allowed in an action
under the 1933 Act.'" The case also upheld the long-standing conten-
tion of the SEC that an agreement by the issuer to indemnify the
underwriter is contrary to public policy and unenforceable if the
underwriter has "actual knowledge of the misstatement" and demon-
strates "wanton indifference" to his obligations.'"
Aside from these two cases, the scope of the 1933 Act had been at
least reasonably well-defined by 1960, and the reported cases have, in
general, not established any particularly startling princiPles.
' B. 1934 Act Cases
The 1933 Act is principally concerned with the original issuance
of securities by corporations and their sale to the public, and would
not be expected to generate as much important litigation as the 1934
Act, which deals with the purchase and sale of securities after their
issue. The dollar amounts involved in even a relatively small original
issue are apt. to be astronomical, and extreme (and often expensive)
care in its processing is the general rule. The 1934 Act, on the other
hand, applies to all stock exchanges, all broker-dealers and all persons
buying or selling securities. The 1934 Act, therefore, involves in one
way or another every person who owns or comes into contact with a
security.
180 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
140 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1964).
141 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
142 418 F.2d at 1284-85.
143 15 U.S.C. g 78bb(a) (1964).
144 418 F.2d at 1286.
145 Id. at 1288-89.
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1. Rule 10b-5
Probably the most iniportant developments in the field of litiga-
tion involving the securities business during the 1960s occurred in
litigation under Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.146 This rule, strangely enough, was originally
drafted in 1942 merely to correct the inadvertent exclusion of sellers
from the protection of the antifraud provisions in Section 17 of the
1933 Act. 747
 The Rule is an antifraud proscription declaring it un-
lawful for a person buying or selling a security to misstate or fail to
state any material fact or generally to indulge in any fraudulent activity
regarding the transaction. Before the opening of the decade there had
been a few cases, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,'"
holding that the defrauded buyer or seller could sue the other party
to a securities transaction under this section by implying a civil remedy
not expressly provided in the Act. The difficulties in applying this
concept stemmed mainly from the fact that a purchaser (but not a
seller) was given specific but restricted remedies under Section 12 of
the 1933 Act,'" while there were no such restrictions inherent in the
implied cause of action under the 1934 Act. In discussing these cases,
Professor Loss in his 1961 treatise observed that:
The danger, of course, is that the continued denigration
of the buyers' expressed remedy under the 1933 Act in favor
of Rule 10b-5 and even Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act itself
may persuade the Supreme Court—which has yet to consider
any implied remedy under SEC statutes—to throw its collec-
tive hands up and the Kardon doctrine out.'"
At the present writing, although the Supreme Court has still not been
faced with the 'necessity of resolving the anomalies inherent in the
Kardon doctrine of the implied remedy under Rule 10135, nine out
of ten circuit courts have expressed their approval of it. 151 In fact,
the decision of the Supreme Court in I. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 1152 indi-
146 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, (1970).
147 15 U.S.C. I 77q (1964) prohibits devices, schemes or artifices to defraud, material
misstatements or omissions, and fraud or deceit in the offer or sale of securities. Thus, only
buyers are protected by the section.
148 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
140 15 U.S.C.
	
771 (1964) provides in part that a buyer may "recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security."
lso 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1790 (2d ed. 1961).
151 See 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3871-72 (Supp. 1969). Professor Loss has
reaffirmed his misgiving of the implied civil remedy. Id. at 3918.
162 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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cates quite clearly that the Court will uphold the Kardon doctrine.
In Borah it approved a cause of action based upon an implied right
of civil recovery under the proxy provisions of Section 14 of the 1934
Act" and the rules promulgated thereunder.'
The litigants in almost any securities transaction have, with in-
creasing frequency, taken advantage of the Rule 10b-5 action wher-
ever there was the slightest chance that it might be applicable. The
extent to which these actions have proliferated is perhaps best illus-
trated by the fact that an eminent authority in securities law has
written a full-length book on Rule 10b-5 citing roughly 700 cases."
The courts almost without exception, have been receptive to this ex-
pansion of the rule. The plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 actions enjoy the
benefit of exclusive federal jurisdiction, no diversity or minimum
damage requirement, nationwide service of process and extremely
broad venue provisions." Furthermore, the federal courts apply the
local statute of limitations' and there is no bond required or other
limitation placed on a stockholder's suit, except where a cause of
action under state law is included under the doctrine of pendant juris-
diaion.158 Moreover, the class action has been used repeatedly, par-
ticularly after the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.'
This tendency to expand the application of Rule lOb-5 is perhaps
best illustrated by the two Rule 10b-5 cases decided by the Supreme
Court during the decade. In Tcherepnin v. Knight,'" it extended the
coverage of the rule to withdrawable shares in a building and loan
association. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,'" the Court applied the
rule to an insurance company merger which had the approval of
the state insurance commissioner but which involved a false proxy
statement. In doing so, the Court quickly dismissed the argument
that the jurisdiction under the proxy rules excluded remedies under
Rule 10b-5." 2
Perhaps the most important cases under Rule 10b-5 involved ac-
tions by the SEC against brokers, dealers, corporations and corporate
153 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
134 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969).
155 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule lOb-5 (1969).
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
157 See Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 325-28
(D. Del. 1956).
158 See, e.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 67-70 (S.D.N.Y.•1967).
159 .Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.• •	 •
160 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
161 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
10:4 Id. at 468-69.
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officers. Section 15 of the 1934 Ace" gives the SEC very broad regu-
latory powers over the brokers and dealers, who are, of course, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 10 and Rule 10b-5. From the very
early days of this regulation, the broker-dealer has been considered
by the SEC to have a fiduciary responsibility to his customers, re-
quiring him to treat them fairly and honestly. Just how fairly and
honestly was clarified in the landmark case of Cady, Roberts &
involving the failure of a broker to disclose to the public information
received by him through a corporate director concerning a decrease in
dividend rates. In a wide-ranging opinion, Chairman Cary delineated
the application of Rule 10b-5 to the broker-dealers industry, inform-
ing them that they could not fail to disclose material corporate devel-
opments.'" Thus the Commission held there was a violation of
Rule 10b-5 when a broker-dealer in possession of undisclosed un-
favorable corporate information sold stock at a price higher than it
could have if the suppressed information had been disclosed.'"
The same rationale was applied in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 1" where the broker-dealer obtained advanced informa-
tion about a significant reduction in earnings of a corporation while
acting as syndicate manager for the corporation in a securities issu-
ance, and where it then passed the information only to its favorite
customers. The thrust of the Cady, Roberts case was rather strikingly
illustrated in Merrill Lynch by the fact that the broker was concur-
rently buying the same stock for some of its less valued clients.'"
The Commission again emphasized that full and fair disclosure re-
quires that inside information not be utilized before the information
is released to the public.'"
In 1965 the SEC brought an injunctive action, including a prayer
for ancillary civil relief, against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company
(TGS). The Commission alleged that in violation of Rule 10b-5, some
of the TGS officers, directors and employees had bought TGS' securi-
ties on the basis of material undisclosed corporate information con-
cerning a major ore discovery, and that the company had issued a
false and misleading press release to allay rumors of this development.
The trial court supported the holding in Cady, Roberts but exonerated
some of the defendants on the ground that they acted before the
In 15 U.S.C. 78o (1964).
184 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
166 Id. at 910-14.
166 Id. at 911-12.
167 SEC Securities Each. Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), reprinted in [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 47,629.
168 Id. at 83,349.
166 Id. at 83,349-50.
856
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION
information became material'" or after the information had been
made public.'" The lower court also held the press release not to be
misleading or deceptive.'" On appeal, the circuit court reversed,'
holding that the trial court had been too lenient in its application of
the principles announced in Cady, Roberts. The court found that the
information relating to the ore discovery was material since a reason-
able investor's actions would be affected by it."' Consequently, the
court held that the defendants had violated Rule 10b-5 by buying
TGS stock without disclosure to all investors."' The court also held
that the Commission was entitled to injunctive relief if TGS had
failed to exercise due diligence thus making the press release mis-
leading to a reasonable investor.'" It has been indicated that since
TGS was an injunctive action the same considerations or at least the
same quantum of proof employed in Texas Gulf might not apply to
implied private causes of action."' Once it has been conceded that
a private cause of action exists under Rule 10b-5, however, this dis-
tinction is perhaps not justified if the plaintiff can show damages.
In the course of broadening the application of Rule 10b-5, the
courts have gone to great lengths to construe the wording of the rule
in such a manner as to include almost any transaction involving secu-
rities, directly or indirectly. In so doing they have at times appeared
to be applying what was referred to in McClure v. Borne Chem.
Co. 1" as a federal common law applicable to corporations. Whatever
criticism may be made of this tendency, and although the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has at times balked at some rather remote
extensions of this concept,'" during the 1960s it became an estab-
lished pattern which will be difficult to change, either by litigation
or legislation. The protection afforded investors by the developments
170 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
171 Id. at 288-90.
172 Id. at 296. The court noted that "[w)hile, in retrospect, the press release may
appear gloomy or incomplete, this does not make it misleading or deceptive on the basis
of facts then known." Id.
173 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
174 Id. at 849-51.
175 Id. at 848-52.
175 Id. at 863-64.
177 Some of the concurring judges in Texas Gulf voiced hesitation in applying the
standards announced therein to private actions. Id. at 864-69. See also SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963), where the Court stated: "It is
not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements
required in a suit for monetary damages."
This reasoning was adopted by Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540,
54647 (2d Cir. 1967), to allow injunctive relief to private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5.
178 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
170 See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) ; O'Neil
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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under Rule lOb-5 seems far too valuable to destroy. Thus, the lawyer
reviewing a securities transaction must now be extremely careful to
examine any facts which would indicate an unfairness or over-reaching
by any party to the transaction.
2. Short-term Trading
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.'" makes an officer, director, or
ten-percent stockholder of a corporation liable to the corporation for
any profit he has made as the result of a purchase and sale or sale
and purchase of the corporation's stock within a six-month period.
The basic interpretations of and principles for implementing this
section had been well established by 1960 and, although some cor-
porate officers still indulge in short-term trades, the business world
in general has become aware of this limitation and the cases which
arose in the 1960s normally involved unusual facts. In Newmark
v. RKO Gen., Inc. 181 the defendant owned 56 percent of the stock
of corporation A. In May, 1967 it bought 49 percent of the stock of
corporation B, which had previously agreed to merge with A. The
merger was effected and the defendant received additional shares of
A in exchange for its holdings in B. This was held on summary judg-
ment to be a sale of its B stock subject to section 16(b) liability 182
In measuring damages the trial court computed the plaintiff's recovery
to be $7,920,681.' 83
Until 1966 the application of section 16 to a person who con-
verted a convertible security and immediately sold the underlying
stock was far from clear, although the tendency was to strip him of
his profit.'" Although the cases provided little clarification, 185 the SEC
finally settled much of this confusion in 1966 by adopting an exemp-
tive rule declaring that a conversion of an equity security (which
includes a convertible debenture) is not a purchase within the meaning
of section 16. 186
 The power of the SEC to adopt such a rule has been
questioned,' but at least for the present a conversion by an insider
180 15 U.S.C.
	 78p(b) (1964).
181 294 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
182 Id. at 362-66.
183 Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 92,480, at
98,267 (S.1).N.Y. Sept. 22, 1969).
184 See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
185
 In Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), the court indicated that every
conversion was not a § 16(b) violation since the inquiry had to be made whether
the conversion "makes possible the unfair trading that Section 16(b) was designed to
prevent." Id. at 518. The court then held that the conversion in Blau "was not a
Section 16(b) sale . . . ." Id. at 522.
186 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1969).
187 In Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1967), Justice Blackmun's dissent
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or a corporate reorganization involving convertibles can proceed
without violating section 16(b).
Another troublesome question concerning the application of
section 16 has involved purchases and sales of broker-dealer firms
having a partner on the board of an issuer. This question was not
completely settled by Rattner v. Lehmanlas and Blau v. Lehman's'
which exonerated the partnership while holding that the partner-
director violated section 16(b). The problem was somewhat clarified
in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,"° where defendant Martin Mari-
etta acquired a substantial block of stock of Sperry Rand Corporation.
Shortly thereafter the president of Martin Marietta was invited to
sit on the board of Sperry Rand, which he did after consulting with
his own board. However, Martin Marietta's president resigned from
the Sperry Rand board and Martin Marietta, thereafter sold its
holdings in Sperry Rand within six months after their purchase. The
court held that section 16(b) applied because the appointment by a
stockholder (Martin Marietta) of a person to sit on the board of
the issuer (Sperry Rand) deputizes that director as an agent and
has the same result as if the stockholder himself were on the board."'
Thus, the court required Martin Marietta to pay to Sperry Rand the
profits made on the sale of Sperry Rand stock.'
The Feder case settled another question that had long been
troubling securities practioners. As indicated above the director had
resigned shortly before the insider sold its holdings. Consequently the
director did not have to report the transactions as required by sec-
tion 16(a) of the 1934 Act," because the Commission by its rules
had exempted the insider under these circumstances.'" The Feder
court held that such rules were beyond the SEC's power, and that as
long as the purchase and sale were within six months, it did not
matter that the director had resigned during the six months.' This
is a logical holding in view of the fact that the purpose of the section
was to prevent the use of corporate information for private gain. Feder
simply makes it clear that the insider cannot resign as a director or
questioned the authority of the Commission to adopt this exemptive rule. He stated:
"I am not entirely sure that Congress . . meant to give the Commission power so to
legislate at will by abruptly changing the reach of the statute .. ."
Id. at 539.
188 193 F.2d 564, 565-66 (2d. Cir. 1952).
189 368 U.S. 403, 409-14 (1963).
190 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
101
 Id. at 264-68.
192 Id. at 269.
193 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
194 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1970).
1 95 406 F.2d at 268-69.
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an officer after learning of approaching corporate events, and thus be
free to buy or sell the stock. The SEC has since changed its reporting
rules to conform to the Feder case."'
Section 16(d) of the 1934 Act,197 added by the 1964 Amend-
ments, exempts a broker-dealer who is making a market in a stock
from liability under section 16(b). Consequently, an underwriter who
is engaged in making' an "after-market" by offering to buy or sell,
on the over-the-counter market, shares of an issuer which he has
successfully sold to the public, is in no danger if he or one of his
partners is on the board of the issuer. However, this does not apply
to a broker-dealer who holds 10 percent of the issuer's securities
in an investment account or trades a security listed on an exchange.
3. Proxy Rules
Section 14 of the 1934 Act"' gives the SEC jurisdiction over all
proxy materials sent out to stockholders and the SEC has adopted
rules thereunder."' Prior to 1964 these rules applied only to listed
securities, and the failure of some listed companies (which were not
required to seek proxies to get a quorum) to send out adequate infor-
mation as to stockholders' meetings was of relatively little importance
to the SEC, since at least the New York Stock Exchange had adopted
a policy requiring the solicitation of proxies and the furnishing of
the proxy statement pursuant to the rules. However, at the time the
1964 amendments were adopted, not only was the scope of applicabil-
ity of section 14 extended, but Congress also added section 14(c) 200
giving the SEC power to regulate the disclosure of corporate affairs
to stockholders of corporations which did not seek proxies. The SEC
promptly adopted Regulation 140" which compels a corporation not
seeking proxies to send out an information statement containing sub-
stantially the same material as was required from other corporations
under the prior rules. The net result is that all important corporations
now have to report annually to their stockholders and furnish them
with adequate financial data.
Prior to 1960 there had been enough litigation involving the proxy
rules so that it was possible to predict with a fair amount of accuracy
how the rules would be applied to a given set of facts. There were,
however, two confusing types of cases relating to the standing of
na 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1970).
197 15 U.S.C. § 78p(d) (1964).
198 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
100 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-103 (1969).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1964).
201 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-1 to .14t-7 (1969).
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private causes of action. It was held in Howard v. Furst,202 for ex-
ample, that there was no implied civil action arising out of a false
proxy statement. A great deal of doubt also existed as to what relief
the federal court could give to a stockholder if the stockholder was
able to prove a violation of the proxy rules.' Both these prob-
lems were settled by the Supreme Court in 1964 in J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak,'" where the Court sustained a private cause of action under
section 14 based on an implied liability," and held that the federal
courts had full power to take whatever steps were necessary to remedy
the situation resulting from such a violation. 2°0 The other proxy liti-
gation during the 1960s involved the question whether the proxy
material therein was defective. This type of inquiry, particularly in
the context of an attempt to gain corporate control, is often very
bitterly fought, but the cases hinge upon the facts of the particular
case and not upon any important questions of statutory interpretation.
4. Investment Companies
By 1960 the stockholders in investment companies started to
bring actions attacking the administration of the mutual funds, usually
on the theory that the investment advisory fees were disproportionate.
Most of these cases have been terminated by settlement introducing,
typically, a new scale of graduated investment advisory fees. Those
which have gone to the merits have seldom, if ever, resulted in find-
ings for the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs had difficulty establishing
a cause of action. The litigation, however, resulted in one noteworthy
case which greatly expanded a mutual fund shareholder's rights. 207
In Brown v. Bullock, the court adopted the rationale of the Kardon
case and held that an injured shareholder had an implied cause of
action208 under the Investment Company Act.'
CONCLUSION
The SEC, during the first 25 years of its life, had attained an
enviable reputation as a model of bureaucratic elasticity. Until 1960
at least, its efficiency was equally notable. During the subsequent
years, while it retained its ability to mold its activities to a shifting
industry pattern and to exercise its power with principal attention
202 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
203 See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 210-17 (6th Cir. 1961).
204 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
2°5 Id. at 430-31.
2" Id. at 433-35.
201 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
208 Id. at 420-21.
2°9 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964).
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to the public interest, it came to suffer from budgetary insufficiency.
This fact, combined with the tremendous increase in the volume of
securities transactions, has limited the enforcement effectiveness of the
Commission.
There is no doubt that the Commission will, in the years to come,
continue to adapt itself to the realities of the industry which it regu-
lates. The recommendations of the Special Study and the Wheat Re-
port indicate that the Commission is examining every means possible
to make its operations more efficient. Whether it succeeds in its efforts
to operate efficiently and promptly is another question, the answer
to which is far more in the control of Congress than within the power
of the Commission.
R62'
